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Canada’s Empirically-Based Child
Competency Test and its Principled
Approach to Hearsay
Nicholas Bala*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE VALUE OF A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

For those interested in law reform or a better understanding
of the value and limitations of their own legal regime, there is
great utility in considering the approaches taken in other
jurisdictions to common legal and social problems. This paper
offers a comparative perspective on some of the controversies
surrounding the treatment of child witnesses, focusing on two
areas in which Canadian law has undergone substantial reform
and significantly differs from United States law: (1) legislation
governing the competence of children to testify; and (2) the
common law rules governing the admission of hearsay evidence,
especially concerning children’s out-of-court statements regarding
abuse.
As in the United States, over the past three decades there
have been dramatic changes in Canada in the understanding of
child abuse, as well as great increases in the number of reported
cases of both historic and contemporary child abuse cases,
especially child sexual abuse.
There have also been very
substantial changes in how the justice system treats children.
Until the 1980s, Canadian law was premised on the view that
child witnesses were inherently unreliable, and very little effort
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada. The
author wishes to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada for financial support for the preparation of this paper.
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was made to accommodate these witnesses in the courts.1 In the
1980s, the justice system began to respond to the growing
understanding of the nature and extent of child abuse, and to the
growing body of psychological research on the reliability of child
witnesses. 2 As a result, judges and legislators have introduced
many substantive, evidentiary, and procedural reforms, which
have resulted in many more successful prosecutions in cases in
which children are witnesses. 3
This article discusses two areas of major reform in the laws
concerning children and other vulnerable witnesses in Canada.
The first is the amendment of the legislation governing the
competence of witnesses to testify, and the second is changes in
the common law rules governing hearsay. In both of these areas,
developments in social science research have had an important
role in shaping law reform. Similar to lawmakers in the United
States, lawmakers in Canada have struggled with balancing the
need to expand the scope for admission of evidence through child
witnesses and to facilitate the search for the truth in the justice
system against protection of the rights of the accused. However,
in these two areas, the Canadian law may have reached a
preferable balance; a balance that more faithfully reflects the
growing body of research on child development and the capacities
of children without sacrificing the rights of the accused. Of
course, in each country this balancing occurs in the context of its
own constitutional framework. Still, Canadian legislators and
judges have taken a more accommodative approach to child
witnesses, which makes the justice system more responsive to
children’s needs and capacities.
II. THE CANADIAN CONTEXT

A. Constitutional & Legal Contexts
For the purposes of this comparative study, it is worth
providing American readers with a very brief introduction to
Canada’s legal system. Canada is a federal country, but unlike
the United States, where the primary responsibility for the
enactment criminal laws is a state responsibility, the Parliament
1.
2.
3.

See infra Part II(b) of this article.
See id.
See infra Parts III and IV of this article.
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of Canada has the jurisdiction to enact all laws governing
substantive criminal offenses, as well the procedural and
evidentiary rules governing criminal trials.4 The use of jury trials
is much less common in Canada than the United States and
criminal jury trials are restricted to cases where the sentence
could be five years or longer. 5 In general, Canadian sentencing
policies are less punitive than in the United States. In fact, in
some cases, the prosecution (known as “the Crown” in Canada)
may decide to seek a sentence of less than five years just to spare
a child victim the prospect of testifying in a jury trial.
Additionally, it is not uncommon for a defendant to waive his right
to a jury trial, even in more serious sexual offenses cases where
the accused faces a long sentence. Thus, in practice jury trials are
relatively rare. However, as in the United States, the rules of
evidence for criminal cases are, at least in theory, premised on the
use of a jury.
Canada only introduced a constitutionally entrenched Charter
of Rights (“Charter”) in 1982. 6 The Canadian Charter recognizes
similar fundamental rights as in the United States Constitution, 7
such as freedom of religion and the right to equal protection of the
law. One exception is that the Charter has no equivalent to the
Second Amendment right to bear arms. 8 Additionally, some of the
provisions of the Canadian constitutional guarantees have
different wording from their corresponding American provisions.
And, even in situations where there is nearly identical language,
the Canadian courts may interpret that language differently.9
4. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app. II, no. 11, s. 91(27) (Can.).
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, s. 11(f) (U.K.).
6. Id.
7. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an introduction to comparative
legal studies).
8. See R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398, 414 (Can.). For a series
of articles comparing the Canadian and American constitutions, see
Symposium, Comparative United States/Canadian Constitutional Law, 55
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1992).
9. Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Ties That Bind? The Supreme Court
of Canada, American Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal
Law Under the Charter, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 729, 742–44, 778 (1990);
Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The
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Nonetheless, Canadian courts regularly cite American precedents
when dealing with constitutional issues, and American courts
likewise, have cited to Canadian cases on certain issues, notably
those related to same-sex marriages. 10
Additionally, at the time of arrest, the police in Canada are
constitutionally obliged to afford similar rights to the arrestee as
those arrested in the United States. For example, in Canada
there are also restrictions on search, detention, and police
interrogation, as well as provisions that a detained person has the
right to counsel and the right to seek bail.11 The criminal trial
process in Canada also has a constitutionally guaranteed set of
rights and protections, including the right against selfincrimination.12 Finally, of significance for this paper, while every
person charged with an offense in Canada has to be “presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,” 13 the
Canadian Charter does not have an explicit “confrontation clause.”
Thus, while the accused person in Canada is granted very similar
rights as the accused person in the United States, in Canada, the
accused does not have a constitutional guarantee to confront the
witnesses against him, including child witnesses. 14
Before turning to the specific legal issues that are the primary
subject of this paper, I offer a brief overview of the developments
over the past three decades in the understanding and awareness
of child abuse, and the corresponding changes in the Canadian
criminal justice system regarding the treatment of children.
These developments are broadly similar in both the United States
and Canada, as well as in many other jurisdictions throughout the
Supreme Court Of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing
Revision of Criminal Law Under the Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 39–40,
67–69 (1992) (arguing that, on balance, a defendant has a more extensive set
of constitutionally protected rights in Canada than in the USA).
10. See, e.g., Rosen v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 961, 968 (Can.) (discussing the
similarities and differences of the protection against coerced confessions
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process
Clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604
(2003) (discussing Canada’s approach to same-sex relationships).
11. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.
11, ss. 8–11 (U.K.).
12. Id. s. 13.
13. Id. s. 11(d).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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world. 15
B. Changing Understandings of Child Abuse & Reforming Child
Witness Laws
The historic English common law that is the basis of the
criminal law in both the United States and Canada was premised
on the belief that children are inherently untrustworthy witnesses
and are prone to making false allegations of sexual abuse. Thus,
the rules about child witnesses were based on the prevailing social
and legal myths of the late nineteenth century that children were
inherently unreliable witnesses and that sexual abuse of children
was a rare occurrence. 16 These laws were also based on the
opinions of early psychological researchers about the unreliability
of children; however, these views have since been totally
discredited as being based on biased clinical observations. 17
In 1893, around the time when the first child protection
agencies were being established to help child victims of abuse or
abandonment, Canada enacted its first legislation concerning
child witnesses, permitting children to give “unsworn testimony,”
allowing a child to testify without giving an oath to promise to tell
the truth. 18 However, children could only give unsworn testimony
if they demonstrated their understanding of the “duty to speak the
truth,” and additionally, such unsworn testimony required
corroboration in order to convict the accused. Further, as late as
1967, the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned that the common
15. See generally John E. B. Myers, A Decade of International Legal
Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward a
Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J. 169 (1996).
16. See, e.g., 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 505–509 (1904); 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1821,
1832 (1904).
17. Carol Smart, A History of Ambivalence and Conflict in the Discursive
Construction of the ‘Child Victim’ of Sexual Abuse, 8 SOC. LEG. STUD. 391,
391, 399, 406 (1999).
18. Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 25 (Can.). In the 1908
consolidation of the Act, this became Chapter 145, Section 16. See Id. at c.
145, s. 16. In Canada, the federal Parliament has jurisdiction for the
enactment of criminal laws—substantive, procedural and evidentiary, while
the provinces have responsibility for the “administration of justice.” The
Judicial Structure, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 23, 2013, 6:16 PM),
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/07.html.
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law required jurors to be warned of the “inherent frailties” of a
child’s testimony even if the child was a sworn witness.19 Until
the end of the twentieth century, no efforts were made in Canada
to modify court processes to facilitate children’s testimony.
Because of this social and legal environment, relatively few
reports of child abuse were made to the police or healthcare
professionals, reinforcing the notion that child abuse was rare.
Around the same time, the women’s movement of the 1970s
helped support adult survivors of childhood abuse, initially mainly
female victims, to feel comfortable enough to come forward with
first-person accounts of their experiences. 20 Encouraged by media
reports and a growing professional sensitivity, by the 1980s larger
numbers of adult survivors began to overcome their feelings of
fear, guilt, and shame to disclose what had occurred to them in
childhood. In Canada, the 1984 release of the Badgley Committee
Report substantially increased awareness of child sexual abuse.21
This government-commissioned report documented the extent of
child sexual abuse in Canada, revealed major failings in the
responses to abuse, and made many recommendations for legal
and social reforms.22
By the late 1980s, the Canadian public was being shocked by
detailed disclosures from adult survivors about child abuse in
schools, juvenile institutions, churches and sporting organizations
across the country. Many of the cases involved some of society’s
most vulnerable children, those without parents to protect them,
placed by the state in child welfare institutions or in the sinceclosed residential schools for Aboriginal children. 23 Many children
in these institutions were victims of abuse at the hands of
teachers and supervisors, many of whom were ministers, priests

19.
20.

R. v. Horsburgh, [1967] S.C.R. 746, 765, 778 (Can.).
See JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing how feminist movements, specifically
the unprecedented numbers of women enrolling in law schools, contributed to
unveiling issues in child sexual abuse).
21. SEXUAL OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN IN CANADA: SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN AND
YOUTHS 1 (1984).
22. Id.
23. See LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, RESTORING DIGNITY: RESPONDING TO
CHILD ABUSE IN CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS 12–13, 30 (2000).
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or nuns. 24 There was also growing awareness that child sexual
abuse is often perpetrated by family members, close family friends
or trusted community figures, such as priests, coaches and
teachers.25
As disclosures of abuse became more common, concerns about
the inappropriateness of distrusting children’s evidence in the
court system prompted new psychological research into the
reliability of child witnesses.26 This research revealed that, when
questioned in an appropriate way, children can be reliable
witnesses and that even young children can distinguish fantasy
from reality. 27 With the growing awareness of the realities of
abuse, a more receptive environment for disclosures of abuse by
children developed, and children were encouraged to report abuse.
As a result, reports of abuse by children increased dramatically,
and the justice system had to deal with many children being
brought forward as witnesses. It became clear that fundamental
legal reforms were required in order to permit children to testify
properly. Canada’s Parliament responded to the drastic increase
in reports by enacting substantial reforms. The first major
statutory reforms came into force in 1988, 28 with further
significant legislative changes in 1993 29 and 2006. 30 Discussed
infra in further detail, these statutory reforms provided for better
accommodation child witnesses, for example, allowing for the use
of closed circuit television, as well as a change in the test for
establishing the competence of child witnesses. These statutory
24. See id. There have been a number of deeply disturbing public
inquiries into child abuse in children’s institutions and schools in Canada.
Id. at 1.
25. Id.
26. See John E.B. Myers, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S. Goodman,
Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for
Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 10–11, 13
(1996).
27. Id.
28. See Nicholas Bala, Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the
Canadian Criminal Justice System, 15 QUEEN’S L J. 3, 3–4 (1990) (discussing
the 1988 amendments).
29. Young Offenders Act, S.C. 1993, c. 45, paras. 7, 9 (Can.).
30. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, as amended by S.C. 2005,
c. 32, s. 27 (Can.); see also Nicholas Bala et al., Bill C-2: A New Law for
Canada’s Child Witnesses, 32 CRIM. REP. (6th) 48 (2005) (discussing the 2005
amendments), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries
/cornwall/en/hearings/Exhibits/Nicolas_Bala/pdf/Bill_C-2.pdf.
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reforms also allowed for admission of video-recorded evidence of
statements of children.
At the same time that the above-mentioned legislative
reforms were being enacted, the courts also changed the common
law evidentiary rules applicable to child witnesses. Among the
changes, the courts reformed the hearsay rule and rules governing
such matters as the admissibility of the accused’s prior history of
abuse, known as the “similar fact rule.” 31 Canadian courts also
came to recognize that children can be reliable witnesses, and that
it is unfair and inappropriate to have general rules discounting
their evidence. Thus, in 1988, the Canadian Parliament abrogated
the statutory rule that the unsworn testimony of a child needed to
be corroborated,32 though some judges continued to apply the
common law warning rule, advising juries about the “inherent
frailty” of the testimony of children, whether sworn or unsworn.33
Subsequently, the Canadian Supreme Court revisited the issue in
1992 in R. v W.(R.), rejecting “the stereotypical but suspect” views
about child witnesses, and abolishing the common law warning
rule. 34 Justice McLachlin observed:
The law affecting the evidence of children has undergone
changes in recent years. The first is removal of the
notion, found at common law and codified in [repealed]
legislation, that the evidence of children was inherently
unreliable and therefore to be treated with special
caution . . . The repeal of provisions creating a legal
requirement that children’s evidence be corroborated does
not prevent the judge or jury from treating a child’s
evidence with caution where such caution is merited in
the circumstances of the case. But it does revoke the
assumption formerly applied to all evidence of children,
often unjustly, that children’s evidence is always less
reliable than the evidence of adults.35

31. See, e.g., R. v Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 (Can.).
32. Criminal Code, S.C. 1993, c. 45, para. 9 (Can.).
33. See, e.g., R. v. Hanna (1993), 80 CCC 3d 289, para. 62 (Can.
B.C.C.A.)
34. R. v. W. (R.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, 132–33 (Can.).
35. Id.
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[Justice McLachlin] also alluded to the growing body of
psychological literature on the reliability and perceptions of
children:
The second change in the attitude of the law toward the
evidence of children in recent years is a new appreciation
that it may be wrong to apply adult tests for credibility to
the evidence of children. One finds emerging a new
sensitivity to the peculiar perspectives of children. Since
children may experience the world differently from
adults, it is hardly surprising that details important to
adults, like time and place, may be missing from their
recollection . . . Every person giving testimony in court, of
whatever age, is an individual, whose credibility and
evidence must be assessed by reference to criteria
appropriate to her mental development, understanding
and ability to communicate. 36
The Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects a recognition that
children can be as reliable as adults when recalling an incident,
even though they may not be able to describe events in as much
detail as adults and may be unable to answer some kinds of
questions that adults can. Despite their reliability, however, there
is no presumption in favor of a child’s testimony. Rather, a child’s
testimony is to be individually assessed in the context of all of the
other evidence. Furthermore, although there is no legal
requirement for corroboration, and it is possible to obtain a
conviction solely on the basis of the testimony of a young child (or
even on hearsay evidence from a young child who is not competent
to be a witness), it is clearly helpful to the Crown’s case to have
some form of independent evidence to ‘support’ the child’s
testimony. This could be medical testimony, ‘similar fact evidence’
(evidence of other acts of abuse by the accused), or other evidence.
Unfortunately in the 1980s, at the same time that genuine
cases of abuse—both contemporary and historic—were being
reported and victims began to receive support, in Canada (and
other countries), there were also a relatively small number of
allegations reported to the police that later proved to be
unfounded. These cases typically were the result of the
36.

Id. at 133–34.
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inappropriate actions by undertrained police investigators,
therapists, or child welfare staff. While there have been no
documented cases in Canada of individuals being imprisoned as a
result of false allegations of child abuse, there were a number of
cases of clearly unfounded allegations that went to trial in both
the criminal and family justice systems. The most infamous
Canadian case of unfounded allegations occurred in 1992 in
Martensville, Saskatchewan, as a result of overzealous,
inadequately
trained
police
investigators
engaging
in
inappropriate questioning to “encourage” young children to
“disclose” suspected abuse. 37 More than a dozen adults, including
part of the small town’s police force, were charged of abusing
several young children at a daycare center, though many of these
charges were eventually cleared. 38 Although relatively small in
number, cases of unfounded allegations impose immense burdens
on those falsely accused of abuse.39 The Martensville accusations
demonstrated the need for careful investigations by properly
trained investigators, a fair trial process that allows accusations
to be properly tested, and an overall reminder that there should
still be certain restraints on witnesses.
III: WITNESS COMPETENCE TO TESTIFY: CANADA EVIDENCE ACT
SECTION 16.1

A. Common Law and Early Statutory Reforms
For centuries, the common law competency inquiry (or voir
dire) was a critical, initial barrier that prevented many children
from testifying. At common law, a child was only permitted to
testify if the child could be sworn, which required the child to
demonstrate an understanding of the “nature and consequences”
37. FRANN HARRIS, MARTENSVILLE: TRUTH OR JUSTICE: THE STORY OF THE
MARTENSVILLE DAYCARE TRIALS (1998); see also R. v. Sterling (1995), 102
C.C.C. 3d 481 (Sask. C.A.).
38. See generally HARRIS, supra note 37.
39. See Nicholas Bala et al., Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental
Separation: Smokescreen or Fire?, 13 J. FAM. STUD. 26, 28, 40. (2007). One
situation in which there is a persistently relatively high rate of unfounded
allegations of child sexual abuse is in the context of parental separation;
relatively of these cases result in criminal charges, but they pose major
challenges and costs for parents in the family and child protection courts. Id.
at 26.
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of an oath: children were required to express knowledge of the
fact that they would be committing a sin and “burn in the fires of
hell” if they lied under oath.40 Since many younger children
lacked the religious education, abstract thinking and
communication ability to answer questions to demonstrate that
they understood the nature of an oath, this rule often effectively
precluded younger children in the United States, Canada, and
England from testifying about their victimization. This rule was
based on the assumption that children who could not explain the
meaning of the oath were less likely to tell the truth, and hence
should not be permitted to testify. 41
However, around the beginning of the twentieth century,
legislation was enacted in many common law jurisdictions to allow
children to testify even if they could not answer questions about
the oath, but their testimony may be discounted. For instance,
the 1893 Canada Evidence Act (“Evidence Act”) allowed a child to
testify if the judge was satisfied that the child understood the
“duty to speak the truth;” nevertheless, corroboration of unsworn
testimony of a child was required to convict a person.42 Further,
the inquiries under the 1893 Evidence Act into the question of
whether a child understood the “duty to speak the truth” were
often confusing and intimidating, and sometimes resulted in
children who were capable of giving important evidence being
prevented from testifying. Although case law eventually
established that a child only had to appreciate the “social
consequences” of promising, and not the spiritual consequences of
the oath, to be permitted to testify,43 a study of Canadian
practices in the late 1990s revealed that many judges continued to
ask children questions about their understanding of an oath,

40. R. v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.).
41. Nicholas Bala et al., The Competency of Children to Testify:
Psychological Research Informing Canadian Law Reform, 18 INT’L J. CHILD.
RTS. 53, 54 (2010).
42. Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 25 (Can.). In the 1908
consolidation of the Act and thereafter, this became Section 16.
43. R. v. Fletcher (1982), 1 C.C.C. 3d 370, 380 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
to S.C.C. refused, [1983] 48 N.R. 319 (S.C.C.). In R. v. F. (W.J.), Justice
McLachlin commented on the "absurdity of subjecting children
to examination on whether they understood the religious consequences of the
oath." [1999] 3 S.C.R. 569, 591 (Can.).
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including questions about their religious beliefs and observance.44
Significantly, the unsworn testimony of a child required
corroboration, which was often absent in cases where children
were testifying about private victimization, as abuse typically
occurs in private.
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 1893 version of the Act,
in 1988 the Canadian Parliament amended the law to abolish the
requirement for corroboration of “unsworn evidence.” 45 The
amendments also provided that children who did not understand
the nature of an oath could testify upon “promising to tell the
truth,” 46 if they had the “ability to communicate.” 47 However,
despite the amendments, judges continued to have an inquiry into
children’s understanding of such concepts as “truth,” “lie,” and
“promise” before children could testify, 48 based on the assumption
that if children could not explain these concepts, their promise
would not have significance and they would be less likely to tell
the truth. Inevitably, young children, who think in concrete
terms, had difficulty answering questions about these abstract
concepts, and the competence inquiries tended to be longer and
more confusing for them. 49
While the 1988 Evidence Act reforms were significant,
fundamental problems for child witnesses still existed. Research
raised serious questions about the need to preclude children from
testifying on the basis that they could not answer questions
articulating the need for honesty, when adults are never
precluded from testifying on this basis or even asked questions
about it. For instance, a survey of judicial attitudes in the late
1990s revealed that many judges had discomfort with the
competency process, in particular about the intrusive nature of
the questions asked of children.50 In another study, Canadian
judges reported that they believed that children were significantly
44. Nicholas Bala et al., A Legal & Psychological Critique of the Present
Approach to the Assessment of the Competence of Child Witnesses, 38
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409, 411 (2000).
45. Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1987, c. 24, s. 18 (Can.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, 224–225 (Can.).
49. See Nicholas Bala et al., R. v. M. (M.A.): Failing to Appreciate the
Testimonial Capacity of Children, 40 CRIM. REP. (5th) 93 (2001).
50. HARRIS, supra note 26, at 422.
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more likely to be honest than adult witnesses, though recognizing
that children, especially younger children, may be more prone to
making errors due to poor memory or suggestibility. 51
B. Psychological Research and the 2006 Reforms
There is now a growing body of psychological research about
the potential of a child to lie and an adult’s ability to detect when
children are lying.52 Commonly, children begin to lie starting
around age three.53 Almost as soon as they start to lie, children
learn that it is morally wrong to do so. There is no evidence that
younger children, in general, are more likely to lie than older
children or adults, though they lie about different things.
Further, a series of laboratory studies about the start of the
millennium carried out by the author of this paper and his
collaborators in Canada, 54 and by American researchers like Tom
Lyon,55 raised fundamental questions about the competency
inquiry. Researchers have found no evidence to support the
assumption that children’s ability to correctly answer cognitive
questions about the meaning of “truth,” “lie,” and “promise” is
related to whether or not they will actually lie or tell the truth.
However, this research suggested that having a child “promise to
tell the truth” before answering questions, even if the child could
not correctly answer abstract questions about the meaning of the
concepts involved, significantly increased the likelihood that a
51. Nicholas Bala et al., Judicial Assessment of the Credibility of Child
Witnesses, 42 ALTA L. REV. 995, 996–97 (2005).
52. See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 7 (2d ed. 2008); AMINA MEMON, ALDERT VRIJ & RAY BULL,
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 42 (2d ed.
2003).
53. Angela D. Evans & Kang Lee, Emergence of Lying in Very Young
Children, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1958, 1958 (2013).
54. See Victoria Talwar et al., Children's Conceptual Knowledge of Lying
and its Relation to Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence
Examinations, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 395, 395 (2002). See also Nicholas Bala
et al., The Competency of Children to Testify: Psychological Research
Informing Canadian Law Reform, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 53, 53–54 (2002)
(discussing the psychological research in fuller detail).
55. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated
Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16, 16 (1999);
Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated Children’s Reluctance to Answer
Hypothetical Oath-taking Competency Questions, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 81, 81
(2001).
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child would tell the truth. 56
For ethical reasons, none of these laboratory-based studies
involved questions about the abuse of children, but the results of
these studies are consistent with child development theory and
research, which recognizes that young children have a great deal
of difficulty in correctly answering abstract questions about the
meaning of a complex concept like the “promise to tell the truth.”57
It is, however, clear from these studies that young children have a
good understanding of the social importance of truth-telling and of
promising, well before they can answer questions about the
concepts. 58 Children (and often adults) may be able to understand
and correctly use words without being able to define them. For
both adults and children, the process of promising or swearing an
oath is intended to impress on the witness and others in the court
the social significance of the occasion; the oath or promise is a
manifestation of a commitment to tell the truth. Accordingly,
while having a child promise to tell the truth provides no
guarantee of the honesty of the child, it may do some good and
certainly does no harm.
In 2005, shortly after these studies were undertaken and the
results published, a Canadian Parliamentary Committee
considered new legislation to govern child witnesses in criminal
cases. The author of this paper testified at the hearings about this
psychological research 59 and, subsequently, the Committee
introduced a new version of the Act, the Canada Evidence Act
Section 16.1. This version, which came into force in January 2006,
provides that there is a presumption that children are competent
to testify. 60 While children are required to “promise to tell the
truth” before being permitted to testify, Section 16.1(7) of the
Evidence Act specifies that no child shall be “asked any questions
regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise to tell
the truth for the purpose of determining whether their evidence
56. See supra notes 54, 55.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, 38th PARL., 1st Sess., No. 26 (Mar. 24, 2005)
(statement of Nicholas Bala), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/House
Publications/.Publication.aspx?DocId=1718347&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=38&Ses=1.
60. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 s. 16 (Can.).
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shall be received by the court.” 61 A party who challenges the
competence of a child to testify bears the onus of proving to the
court that there is a genuine issue about the child’s ability to
communicate in court. In this case, if there is an inquiry, the sole
test for competence is whether the child is “able to understand and
respond to questions.” 62
Under the test of the “ability to understand and respond to
questions,” the focus of the inquiry is on the child’s basic cognitive
and language abilities. This test is similar to the part of the
inquiry under the 1988 provisions that focused on the child’s
capacity to meaningfully communicate evidence in court. As
required by the Supreme Court in applying that test in R. v.
Marquard, 63 there now needs to be only relatively brief
questioning to establish whether the child has the capacity to
remember past events and answer questions about those events.
The judge has a duty to ensure that the questions posed to the
child during this inquiry and later in the proceedings are
appropriate to the child’s stage of development, with ageappropriate vocabulary and sentence structure.64
The 2006 provisions simplified and shortened the process for
qualifying children giving evidence in criminal cases. A survey of
Canadian judges about their experiences with the 2006 reforms
revealed that 96% of the respondents agreed that the reform of the
competency provision was “useful.” 65 Judges reported that in a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, paras. 236–37 (Can.).
64. See John Philippe Schuman et al., Developmentally Appropriate
Questions for Child Witnesses, 25 QUEEN’S L.J. 251, 296–97 (1999).
L'Heureux-Dubé J., advised:
the trial judge has a responsibility to ensure that the child
understands the question being asked and that the evidence given by
the child is clear and unambiguous. To accomplish this end, the trial
judge may be required to clarify and rephrase questions asked by
counsel and to ask subsequent questions to the child to clarify the
child's responses . . . the judge should provide a suitable atmosphere
to ease the tension so that the child is relaxed and calm.
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 471 (Can.) (emphasis added).
65. NICHOLAS BALA, JOANNE PAETSCH, LORNE BERTRAND & MEAGHAN
THOMAS, TESTIMONIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS FOR CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE
ADULTS (BILL C-2): CASE LAW REVIEW & PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY 48, 61
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/rr10_vic3
/rr10_vic3.pdf. The survey was completed by thirty-four judges in four
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significant portion of cases a child witness is accepted by the
defense as competent without inquiry, often based on a video
recording of a police interview with the child, disclosed to the
defense before the hearing. 66 Judges reported that there is a
competency inquiry in about four-fifths of cases with the youngest
age group (three to five years), which falls to about one quarter
with the older age group (ten to thirteen years). 67 The average
time spent on a competency inquiry is now twelve minutes.68 In
even the youngest age group (three to five years), almost one-half
of the judges reported that they had never found a child
incompetent under the new provision, although a few judges
reported that a small number of children in all age groups were
found incompetent because they could not meaningfully
communicate in court about past events.69
C. Upholding the Constitutionality of C.E.A. Section 16.1
In a number of decisions rendered soon after Section 16.1 of
the Canada Evidence Act came into force in 2006, trial courts
upheld its constitutionality. The trial courts concluded that the
provision is consistent with an accused person’s rights to a fair
trial and “in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.” 70 Subsequently, in 2008, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal rendered the first appellate decision on this provision in R.
v. J.S. 71
The Court of Appeal concluded that the provision reflects the
procedural and evidentiary evolution of Canada’s criminal justice
system, facilitating the testimony of children as a necessary step
in its “truth-seeking goal,” and is constitutionally valid. Justice
jurisdictions. Responses to the survey were collected between November 26,
2007 and January 15, 2008. Judges in the following courts were surveyed:
Alberta Queen’s Bench and Provincial Court; British Columbia Provincial
Court; Nova Scotia Supreme Court and Provincial Court; and Yukon
Territorial Court. The survey was distributed electronically and the response
rate is not known, but was likely in the range of 10%–20%. Id. at viii, 13.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., R. v. Persaud, [2007] O.J. 432 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); R v. J.F.
[2006] A.J. 972 (Can. A.B. Prov. Ct.).
71. [2008] B.C.C.A. 401 (Can.), aff’g, R. v. J.S., [2007] B.C.J. 1374 (S.C.).
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D.M. Smith wrote:
I do not accept the . . . argument that if a moral obligation
to tell the truth is not established, the testimony of the
witness should be inadmissible. Parliament . . . has
decided that a promise to tell the truth is sufficient to
engage the child witness’s moral obligation to tell the
truth. Section 16.1 . . . discards the imposition of rigid
pre-testimonial requirements which often prevented a
child from testifying because of their inability to
articulate an understanding of abstract concepts that
many adults have difficulty explaining. It reflects the
[research] findings . . . that the accuracy of a child’s
evidence is of paramount importance, not the ability of a
child to articulate abstract concepts.72
The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in R. v.
J.S., 73 but in an unusual procedure, the Court dismissed the
appeal from the Bench after hearing from the defendant without
even hearing from the respondent Crown. 74 The Supreme Court
simply upheld the decision of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal but provided no reasons and gave no direct indication of its
views about children and vulnerable witnesses, or the importance
of social science research for determining the constitutional
validity of the law. Interestingly, however, two years later, the
Supreme Court rendered an important decision regarding
mentally disabled adults’ competency to testify, which showed
that the Court is receptive to this type of social science research,
as well as willing to recognize the capacity of vulnerable adults to
relate stories of their victimization.
D. Competency of Intellectually Disabled Adults: R. v. D.A.I.
While the amendments to the Evidence Act that came into
effect in 2006 changed the process for allowing children under
fourteen years of age to testify, for witnesses fourteen years or
older, the previous legislative provisions remained in effect;75
therefore, those fourteen years and older were presumed
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. para. 52–53.
R. v. J.Z.S., [2008] S.C.C.A. 542, 542 (Can.).
R. v. J.Z.S., [2010] S.C.R. 3, 3 (Can.).
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 16.
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competent to testify. The legislation specifies that if the mental
competence of a witness is challenged, there shall be “an inquiry”
into their understanding of the “nature of an oath.” If the witness
does not demonstrate an understanding of the nature of the oath,
but is “able to communicate the evidence,” the witness may testify
“on promising to tell the truth.” This provision does not explicitly
require an inquiry into the understanding of a mentally disabled
adult or adolescent witness of the “promise to tell the truth.”
However, unlike with those under fourteen years of age, there was
no statutory prohibition on the asking of such questions, and pre2006 jurisprudence indicated that witnesses should be asked such
questions. The fact that this provision had not been changed by
the 2006 amendments meant that mentally disabled adults, who
are disproportionately victims of abuse, were often unable to
testify about their victimization. However, in its 2012 decision in
R. v. D.A.I, the Supreme Court of Canada held that this provision
should not be interpreted so as to require an inquiry into whether
a developmentally challenged person understands the meaning of
a promise to tell the truth. 76 The Court effectively required the
same competence standard for mentally disabled adults as
Parliament provided for children.
The D.A.I. case began when a nineteen-year-old
developmentally-delayed woman who had the cognitive
capabilities of a three- to six-year-old child was the alleged victim
of sexual assault. 77 The accused, who had been the live-in
boyfriend of the victim’s mother, was charged with sexual
assault. 78 Using the traditional approach to Section 16(3) of the
Canada Evidence Act, the trial judge determined that the
complainant was not competent to testify, as she could not
“communicate what truth involves or what a lie involves.” 79
Accordingly, the judge found that she did not demonstrate an
understanding of the “duty to speak the truth.” 80 That is, because
she was unable to answer abstract, cognitive questions about the
nature of the duty to speak the truth, she was not permitted to
testify about what she remembered of the events in question. As
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See R. v. D.A.I., [2012] S.C.R. 149, para. 64 (Can.).
R. v. D.A.I., [2008] O.J. No. 1823, para. 2 (Ont. S.C.).
Id.
Id.
D.A.I., [2012] S.C.R. 149 at para. 10.
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the alleged victim was not permitted to testify, the accused was
acquitted, a decision affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 81
However, in its January 2012 decision in R. v. D.A.I., the
Supreme Court reversed the trial and appeal decisions, and
ordered a new trial.82 Writing for a six to three majority, Chief
Justice McLachlin held that if a witness whose mental capacity is
challenged is unable to answer questions about the meaning of the
“nature of the oath,” the judge should only consider whether the
witness can communicate evidence about past events.83 If the
answer to that question is yes, the judge should then simply ask
the witness whether she promises to tell the truth. 84 If she does,
she is competent to testify. 85 It is not necessary or appropriate to
inquire whether the witness understands the duty to tell the
truth.86 While noting that the 2006 reforms only specifically
prohibited asking of children questions about their understanding
of the concepts of promise, truth, and lie, the Court concluded that
Parliament’s failure to extend this protection to mentally disabled
adult witnesses did not mean that Parliament intended this
questioning to continue for mentally disabled adults or older
adolescents. 87
In coming to this conclusion, the Court considered the social
science research, which had established that the ability of children
to correctly answer cognitive questions about the “duty to speak
the truth” is not related to whether or not they actually will tell
the truth. The Court held that there is an “equivalency” between
the tests for assessing the competence of children and mentally
disabled adults. 88 Chief Justice McLachlin wrote:
[The] final and most compelling . . . argument [in favor of
equivalency] is simply this: when it comes to testimonial
competence, precisely what, one may ask, is the
difference between an adult with the mental capacity of a
six-year-old, and a six-year-old with the mental capacity
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

R. v. D.A.I., 2010 CanLII C48807, para. 51 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
[2012] S.C.R. 149, para. 1 (Can.).
Id. para. 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 29.
Id. para. 30.
Id. para. 48.
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of a six-year-old? Parliament, by applying essentially the
same test to both . . . implicitly finds no difference. In my
view, judges should not import one. 89
Thus, R. v. D.A.I. significantly extended the range of cases in
which mentally disabled adults can testify about their
victimization, and increased protection available to this
vulnerable population.
However, there are significant practical and ethical
constraints which make it much more difficult to perform research
with cognitively impaired adults than children. While there is a
significant body of research about children as witnesses, their
competence, suggestibility, credibility and so on, there is no
research on cognitively disabled adults. In D.A.I., the Supreme
Court assumed that social science research establishing that the
inability of children to answer questions about the significance of
truth telling to whether they will actually tell the truth is also
applicable to cognitively impaired adults. In this context, applying
social science research about children to cognitively impaired
adults seems sound. There may, however, be other situations
where applying research about children to cognitively impaired
adults may be more problematic.
E. Comparing Canadian & American Standards for Child
Competence
In most American proceedings, the applicable standard for
assessing the competence of witnesses is established under Rule
601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or similar state provisions: a
witness must be able to “observe, recollect, communicate, and
appreciate the necessity of telling the truth.” 90 This test allows for
questioning of the child about the meaning of a promise to tell the
truth and the duty to tell the truth in court. Therefore, in the
United States, there continues to be cases where children have
been ruled incompetent because they cannot give satisfactory
answers to cognitive questions about the duty to tell the truth.91
89. Id. at para. 52.
90. See, e.g, State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1029 (R.I. 2004) (interpreting
Rule 601 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence).
91. Angela D. Evans & Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing Children’s
Competency to Take the Oath in Court: The Influence of Question Type on
Children’s Accuracy, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 195, 195 (2012).
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In some cases, it is possible that prosecutors may decide to not call
young children, or even abandon prosecutions, because of concerns
about the inability of the child to satisfy the competency standard,
even though the child may be able to effectively describe his or her
victimization.
As discussed above, in Canada the requirement that children
and other vulnerable witnesses must answer abstract questions to
demonstrate an understanding of the “duty to speak the truth”
has been abolished.92 This is consistent with social science
research establishing that, at least for children, the ability to
answer this type of cognitive question is not related to actual
truth-telling behavior. To the extent that children and other
witnesses are still being precluded from testifying by this type of
questioning, American law should be changed. In this area, the
Canadian model of legislative reform is worthy of serious study in
the United States.
The inquiry required by the former Canada Evidence Act and
still permitted in many American states is upsetting to children, a
waste of court time, and does nothing to promote the search for
the truth. Some children who could give honest, reliable evidence
may be prevented from testifying, resulting in miscarriages of
justice. The present Canadian provision, focusing on a child
witness’s ability to understand and answer questions, creates a
much more meaningful test to use to determine whether a child is
competent to testify.
Further, as discussed in the next section of this paper, in
some cases a child may simply not be able to testify in court; in
these cases, Canada’s reformed hearsay laws have helped prevent
miscarriages of justice.
IV: COMMON LAW REFORMS TO CANADA’S HEARSAY LAWS

A. The Principled Approach: Reliability and Necessity
Not infrequently in child abuse cases, the initial disclosures of
abuse by the child to a parent, doctor or investigator are graphic
and highly revealing, and can be important evidence of the child’s
victimization. These disclosures are closest in time to the alleged
92. See R. v. Fletcher [1982], 1 C.C.C. 3d 370, 380 (Ont. C.A.), leave
to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1983] 48 N.R. 319 (S.C.C.).
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events, and are less likely to be affected by suggestive questions.
Especially for younger children, statements given soon after the
events in question may be more complete and detailed than
evidence given at trial months after the events. Historically,
however, these statements were usually excluded as hearsay
evidence. 93 Although the general rules about the exclusion of
hearsay promote a fair and more focused trial, they can be
problematic when applied to cases involving young children who
are victims of abuse, and there are statutory and common law
exceptions to hearsay rules in both Canada and the United States
for child victims.
Until the late 1980s, Canadian courts held that hearsay
evidence was inadmissible unless it could fit within one of the
traditional “hearsay exceptions.” 94 Few of the exceptions were
relevant to a typical child abuse case. However, the Supreme
Court of Canada has expanded the scope for the admission of
children’s disclosures of abuse.
In its 1990 decision in R. v. Khan, a child sexual abuse case,
the Supreme Court of Canada significantly changed the common
law rule about admitting hearsay evidence, allowing its admission
if it is established at a voir dire that the evidence is “reliable” and
its admission is “necessary.” 95 Under this “principled” approach,
hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, and the onus is
on the Crown to establish the statement’s admissibility as reliable
and necessary. 96 In Khan, the Supreme Court ruled that a mother
could testify about a statement made to her by her then threeyear-old daughter about fifteen minutes after an alleged sexual
assault by the child’s doctor during a medical examination, even
though the child was ruled incompetent to testify at the trial and
these statements were hearsay.97 The Supreme Court accepted
93. The definitions of hearsay in Canada resemble those in the United
States. See R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 661–62 (Can.) (“An out-of-court
statement which is admitted for the truth of its contents is hearsay. An outof-court statement offered simply as proof that the statement was made is not
hearsay, and is admissible as long as it has some probative value.”).
94. See, e.g., R. v. O’Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591, 591 (Can.) (holding that
hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they fall under an exception to
the hearsay rule).
95. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 531.
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that the statement was admissible, establishing a broad and
principled approach to the admissibility of this type of hearsay
statement, rather than the traditional specific exception
approcah.98 Justice McLachlin observed that there is a “need for
increased flexibility in the interpretation of the hearsay rule to
permit the admission in evidence of statements made by children
to others about sexual abuse.” 99 She ruled that hearsay
statements are admissible if they meet the test of “necessity and
reliability”:
Necessity for these purposes must be interpreted as
“reasonably necessary.” The inadmissibility of the child’s
evidence might be one basis for a finding of necessity. But
sound evidence based on psychological assessments that
testimony in court might be traumatic for the child or
harm the child might also serve . . . The next question
should be whether the evidence is reliable. Many
considerations such as timing, demeanour, the
personality of the child, the intelligence and
understanding of the child, and the absence of any reason
to expect fabrication in the statement may be relevant on
the issue of reliability. I would not wish to draw up a
strict list of considerations for reliability, nor to suggest
that certain categories of evidence (for example the
evidence of young children on sexual encounters) should
be always regarded as reliable.100
Since Khan, a significant body of jurisprudence has developed
on the admissibility of children’s out-of-court statements in
criminal trials. This type of hearsay evidence is now admitted not
just for the purposes of supporting the credibility of a child who
testifies, but also for the “truth of its contents.”101
Moreover, Canadian courts are now prepared to convict on the
basis of a child’s hearsay statements about abuse, even if the child
does not testify. For example, in its 1993 decision, R. v. J.P., the
Quebec Court of Appeal applied Khan to uphold the conviction of a
man charged with sexually abusing his daughter, two years old at
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 546 (citing Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608 (Can.)).
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the time of the alleged offense and 3.5 years at the time of the
trial.102 The child was not called as a witness, but her mother
testified about her disclosures of abuse.103 The Court held that
given the child’s young age, the “necessity” requirement was
satisfied without the Crown adducing expert or other evidence
about her incapacity to testify. 104 The “reliability” was established
by the fact that so young a child would not normally fabricate a
story showing knowledge of sexual activity unless she were
abused. The allegations were corroborated by medical evidence,
but the hearsay statement was critical to link the accused with
the abuse.105
Since Khan, the Supreme Court has ruled that “necessity”
means “reasonably necessary” and “must be given a flexible
definition, capable of encompassing diverse situations.”106
Necessity is established if the child has been called as a witness
and determined by the court to be not competent to testify under
the standard of the Canada Evidence Act. However, it is not
essential that the judge hear from the child to establish
incapacity, and in cases of children who were three years of age,
judges have taken “judicial notice” of the fact that they are too
young to testify. 107 However, with children age four or older, it is
not sufficient for the Crown merely to decide not to call the child
as a witness; rather, the “necessity” should be established during
voir dire. Necessity as a result of testimonial incompetence might,
for example, be established by testimony from a psychologist who
has interviewed the child and can testify that the child does not
have sufficient ability to understand and respond to questions
about the alleged events in court. Necessity may also be
established if it is shown the child will suffer emotional trauma
from testifying. In considering the issue of “emotional trauma” as
a ground for “necessity,” Justice McLachlin stated in R. v. Rockey
that the test is not one of proving actual psychological injury from
102. R. v. J.P. [1992], 74 CCC 3d 276 (Can. Qc. C.A.), aff’d, R. v. J.P.,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 469, 469 (Can.).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 934 (Can.).
107. See R. v. Peterson, [1996] S.C.C.A 202 (Can.), denying the leave to
appeal, [1996] 27 O.R. 3d 739, 739 (C.A.). See also R v. F. (R.G.), [1997] A.J.
409 (C.A.).
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testifying:
Mere discomfort is insufficient to establish necessity. But
where there is evidence, as here, that an already
traumatized child might be further traumatized by being
questioned by strange men in a strange situation, that
suffices. The Court is not required to wait for proof of
actual harm to the child. 108
Additionally, when assessing the issues of emotional trauma
and ability to communicate, the judge should take account of
whether the child is testifying from behind a screen or by closed
circuit television, as legislation permits in Canada. 109
The Supreme Court of Canada further displayed sensitivity to
child witnesses in applying the concept of “necessity” in its 1999
decision of R. v. F. (W.J.). 110 The child was five years old at the
time of the alleged sexual assaults, and 6.5 years when called as a
witness.111 At the competence inquiry, she had considerable
difficulty in communicating her evidence. 112 To over one hundred
questions during the competence inquiry, the child gave no
response, or only nodded or shook her head, or gave a hand
gesture response. 113 The trial judge ruled her competent to
testify. 114 When asked simple questions about her family or
school, the child only answered in single words or simple phrases.
She became totally silent when asked questions about the alleged
assault. 115 The child was excused from the witness stand and the
Crown then tried to have the child’s out-of-court statements to
various persons admitted. 116 The trial judge ruled that “necessity”
had not been established since there was no expert evidence to
establish that the child was “unable” to testify. The Crown
presented no further evidence and the case against the accused
was dismissed. 117
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

[1996] 3 S.C.R. 829, 846 (Can.).
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1988, c. C-46, s. 486.2 (Can.).
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Can.).
Id. para. 18.
Id. para. 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 23.
Id. para. 25.
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In ordering a new trial, the majority of the Supreme Court
ruled that the trial judge erred in not admitting the hearsay
evidence. 118 Justice McLachlin recognized that the child was
“paralyzed by the court proceedings.” 119 The child was emotionally
overwhelmed by being in an unfamiliar room with “imposing and
intimidating strangers” and being asked questions about
“upsetting and highly personal events.” In this setting, some
children will “find themselves unable to respond [to questions] in
any meaningful way.” 120 Testimony from a mental health
professional to explain the child’s inability to testify may be
desirable, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court accepted that
where it is “self-evident or evident from the proceedings” that a
child cannot give her “evidence in a meaningful way” the necessity
for admission of a child’s out-of-court statements is established.121
In order for a child’s hearsay statement to be admitted, it
must also be found to be “reliable.” Reliability for the purpose of
admissibility is decided on the balance of probabilities at the time
that the Crown seeks to have the statement admitted, but the
ultimate assessment of guilt (and reliability of a hearsay
statement of a child that abuse occurred) must be established
“beyond a reasonable doubt” after an assessment of all of the
evidence. 122 The test of reliability is a “threshold” test that
establishes “a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness;” to be
admissible it is not necessary to establish “ultimate or certain
reliability,” which can only be determined at the end of the
trial. 123 The reliability requirement is aimed at identifying those
cases where the concerns arising from the inability to test the
evidence are sufficiently addressed to justify receiving the
evidence as an exception to the general exclusionary hearsay
rule. The reliability requirement will usually be met by showing
either that there is no real concern about whether the statement
is true because of the circumstances in which it was made or
because, despite being hearsay, its truth and accuracy can
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
(Can.)).

Id. para. 51.
Id. para. 50.
Id. para. 43.
Id. para. 41.
R. v Khelowan, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 57 (Can.).
Id. para. 90 (quoting R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, para 75
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nonetheless be sufficiently tested by means other than
contemporaneous cross-examination. These two principal ways of
satisfying the reliability requirement are not mutually exclusive
categories and they assist in identifying the factors that need to be
considered on the admissibility inquiry.124
An explicit hearsay statement of a young child about sexual
abuse is generally considered sufficiently reliable to be admitted
into evidence, because young children do not ordinarily have
knowledge about sexual matters and thus are unlikely to fabricate
allegations on their own. 125 However, there are examples of
where a child’s hearsay statements are not reliable. If, for
example, there is evidence that a girl engaged in sexual activities
with an older brother and that she tended to lie to deny that such
activity took place between them, the child’s statement to her
foster mother about alleged sexual abuse by her father would be
just “as consistent with the hypothesis that she was protecting”
her brother as with her having been sexually abused by her
father, and hence the statement is unreliable hearsay and
inadmissible.126
B. Video-Recorded Police Interviews: The Code Section 715.1 and
the Common Law
Today in Canada, one of the most commonly admitted types of
children’s hearsay evidence is a video-recording of an investigative
police interview with a child. If the child testifies, the admission
of the recording is governed by statute, but if the child does not
testify, the common law hearsay approach of Khan is applied.
Unlike in the United States, there is no distinction between
“testimonial” and “non-testimonial hearsay,” though Canadian
courts are also concerned about issues of reliability and fairness to
the accused when deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence.
The practice of police video-recording of statements of child
witnesses is now universal in Canada. The practice started
originally in the 1980s for the purpose of reducing the need to
subject the child to repeated interviews, by allowing the videorecording to be shared with investigators from different agencies
124.
125.
126.

Khelowan, [2006] S.C.R. at para. 57.
R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.).
R. v. D.R., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291, 310 (Can.).
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as well as with therapists. Repeated interviewing is potentially
traumatic, and may affect the reliability of a child’s memory.127
The enactment of Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code in 1988 has
encouraged the practice of recording the interviews. This provision
allows for the admission in evidence of video-recordings of
interviews with children under the age of eighteen in regard to
sexual offenses, provided that (1) the recording is made within a
“reasonable time” of the events in question and (2) the child
testifies and “adopts” the contents of the recording while on the
stand. 128 Further, dramatic improvements in the quality and
accessibility of recording equipment, and reductions in cost and
complexity of its use, have made recording of all types of police
interviews with suspects, accused persons and witnesses a
standard police practice.
The constitutional validity of Section 715.1 of the Criminal
Code has been upheld in a number cases. In one of these decisions
in 1993, R v. D.O.L., the Supreme Court of Canada through Chief
Justice Lamer, observed:
By allowing for the videotaping of evidence under certain
express conditions, section 715.1 not only makes
participation in the criminal justice system less stressful
and traumatic for child and adolescent complainants, but
also aids in the preservation of evidence and the
discovery of truth.129
The rights of the accused are adequately protected because,
under this provision, the child must (1) be a witness, (2) “adopt”
the contents of the video-record while testifying, and (3) be
available for cross-examination about its contents. 130
In another decision from 1997, R. v. F. (C.C.), the Supreme
Court of Canada considered psychological research on children’s
memories (although the Court did not refer to any specific studies
and instead used judicial notice to summarize this knowledge).131
127. Laura Melnyk, Angela M. Crossman, & Matthew H. Scullin, The
Suggestibility of Children’s Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR EVENTS 401, 405 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds.,
2007).
128. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1988, c. C-46, s. 715.1 (Can.).
129. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 421 (Can.).
130. Id.
131. R. v. F. (C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1183, para. 19 (Can.).
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Justice Cory stated that a video recording “will almost inevitably
reflect a more accurate recollection of the events than will
testimony given later at a trial.” 132 He ruled that a child who was
testifying had “adopted” the videotape if she “recalled giving the
statement and testified that she was then attempting to be honest
and truthful.” 133 It is not necessary for the child to have a
recollection of the events while testifying; it is sufficient for her to
recollect having made the videotaped statement. 134 At the trial
level in this case, the six-year-old children had some recollection of
the acts of sexual abuse committed by her father, but there were
some inconsistencies between the videotape and her trial
The trial judge admitted the videotape and
testimony. 135
convicted the accused.136 In upholding the conviction, Justice
Cory accepted that these were “minor inconsistencies regarding
peripheral details” and commented:
Obviously a contradicted videotape may well be given less
weight in the final determination of the issues. However,
the fact that the video is contradicted in crossexamination does not necessarily mean that the video is
wrong or unreliable. The trial judge may still conclude . . .
that the inconsistencies are insignificant and find the
video more reliable than the evidence elicited at trial . . .
Although the trier of fact must be wary of any evidence
which has been contradicted, this is a matter which goes
to [its] weight . . . and not to its admissibility. 137
Thus, judges have accepted that if there are inconsistencies
between what a young child says on a video recording made
shortly after the events in question and what is said at trial many
months, and even years after the events in question, the video
may be regarded as “more reliable.” 138 However, if the child on
the stand has no real recollection of the events in question and
there is a lack of corroborating evidence, it may be appropriate to
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at para. 19.
Id. at para. 36.
Id. at para. 4.
Id. at para. 5.
Id at paras. 1–2.
Id. at paras. 47–48.
R. v. Vanderwerff, [2006] A.J. No. 620 (Alta. Q.B.).
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acquit the accused, despite the existence of a video-recording of
the child that implicates him. 139 Further, video recordings may
even benefit the accused. If the child has been subject to
inappropriate, suggestive questions during the video-recorded
interview, this may be captured on the recording and available to
protect an accused from unreliable allegations.
To better understand how video-recording accommodates
child witnesses, an explanation of the process may help: It is
common practice for a child to be shown the video-record by the
prosecutor prior to the child taking the witness stand in order to
prepare the child for testifying. The video is usually shown again
at the start of examination-in-chief, and the child is asked to
“adopt” the contents. If the child acknowledges the truth of the
statement in examination-in-chief, but then in cross-examination
makes inconsistent statements or partially recants, courts have
generally relied on Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code to rule the
statement admissible for the truth of its contents. For example, in
R. v. B.G.B., Justice Dunnet observed, “the test for ‘adoption’ is
not stringent.” 140 The judge upheld a conviction where a fiveyear-old child adopted his statement during examination-in-chief,
but during cross-examination made some statements inconsistent
and contradictory to the statements on the video. 141
In cases where the child is not competent to testify or might
be traumatized by the process of testifying, a video-recording of a
police interview will not be admissible under Section 715.1 of the
Code as the child cannot “adopt” it. However, it may be admissible
under the Khan test of “necessity” and “reliability.” 142
Further, in cases involving children who have recanted their
allegations, it has been accepted that the critical question is the
“reliability” of the prior statement. There may be sufficient
assurance of “threshold reliability” arising from the circumstances
that the statement may be admissible even if not made under oath
or promise to tell the truth. 143 This approach to admissibility of a
139. R. v. C.L.P., [2006] B.C.P.C. 401, para. 22 (Can.).
140. 2005 CanLII 46743, para. 19 (Can. Ont. S.C.). See also R. v. J.R.,
2006 CanLII 31304 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
141. B.G.B., 2005 CanLII 46743 at para. 19.
142. R. v. Collura, 1996 CanLII 8336, para. 8 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
143. When witnesses at trial are recanting their previous statements to
the police, the Canadian courts generally impose a ‘KGB requirement.’ The
‘KGB requirement’ for the admission of previous inconsistent statements and
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video-recording of a police interview with a recanting child is
illustrated by the 2007 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
R. v. R. (T.). 144 During the trial of that case, a twelve-year-old girl
testified and recanted the allegations of sexual abuse that she had
made against her father in a video-recorded police interviews.145
Consequently, she had not adopted the contents of the videorecording under Section 715.1 of the Code. However, the trial
judge held that the video-recorded statement met the reliability
standard for admissibility under the common law test of R. v.
Khan. 146 The Court reasoned that the circumstances surrounding
the recording of the statement suggested that the child understood
the importance of telling the truth, and did so even though the
statement was not made under oath. 147 In addition, the defense’s
ability to cross-examine the child at trial was another factor that
favored the admission of the hearsay evidence. Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that the evidence suggesting that the recantation
might be true did not render the video-recorded statement
inadmissible under Khan, but related to the “ultimate assessment
of the actual probative value of the evidence.” 148 Therefore, the
recording was admissible for the truth of its contents and could be
the basis for a conviction, of course, assessed in the context of all
of the evidence.
C. Comparing the American and Canadian Approaches to Child’s
Hearsay
The “principled approach” of Khan and the Canadian courts to
hearsay has resulted in a significant expansion of the scope for the
admission of children’s disclosures and first reports of abuse,
their use for establishing the truth of their contents (and not merely
impeaching the credibility of the witness) was established by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, 742 (Can.). If the
previous statement is to be admitted for the truth of its contents; the
previous statement will only be admissible if the police conducting the
interview had the witness make the statement under oath or a promise to tell
the truth, and provided an explicit warning of the possibility of the legal
consequences of making a false statement. Id.
144. [2007], 85 O.R. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
145. Id. para. 1.
146. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.).

147.

148.

Id.

T. (R.), 85 O.R. 3d at para. 21.
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allowing the trier of fact, whether a judge or a jury, to consider
“reliable” information to facilitate the search for the truth. This
approach is similar to that of the United States Supreme Court in
its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, with its focus on “indicia of
reliability.” 149 The general Roberts approach was, of course,
abrogated in 2007 by Crawford v. Washington, 150 with its
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay in
the Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The
Crawford decision has potentially significant implications for the
admissibility of children’s hearsay statements, and in particular,
on investigative interviews with police, doctors, and child
protection workers. To date, there have been conflicting appellate
decisions on the applicability of Crawford to the statements of
children to police and other investigators. The Supreme Court of
the United States has yet to rule on this issue, though a number of
scholars have argued that there should be a more flexible
approach to the admission of children’s hearsay disclosures of
abuse; 151 such an approach would facilitate the search for the
truth without jeopardizing the right to a fair trial, and would
recognize the special vulnerability of children.
While the Canadian Charter does not have a “confrontation
clause,” it does guarantee the right to a “fair trial.” One would
hope that in applying Crawford and the Confrontation Clause to
statements of children, the U.S. Supreme Court will follow a
similar approach as adopted in Canada, allowing the trier of fact
to have access to reliable statements of children. The fact that the
statements are admitted is distinct from the ultimate question of
guilt of the defendant, which must be proven beyond reasonable a
doubt. To deny the trier of fact the opportunity to consider such
evidence may deny access to what is often the best evidence
available of what occurred.
V. CONCLUSION: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The criminal justice system is not only concerned with
149. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66–68 (1980).
150. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation in Children’s Cases: The
Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 393, 394–95 (2012); see also
Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation
Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1199 (2012).
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ascertaining the truth but also with fairness, due process, and the
protection of the constitutional rights of the accused. Further,
while most disclosures of child abuse are true, there continue to be
a relatively small number of unfounded allegations. For example,
a child may be mistaken about what occurred, may have identified
the wrong perpetrator, or may have been induced by inappropriate
questioning into making a false allegation; more rarely, children
may fabricate allegations on their own. 152 The state has the
burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
by a fair process and, inevitably, there will be some true
allegations of child abuse that cannot be proven in court.
The role of the criminal justice system, starting with the
police investigation and ending in court, is to balance the rights of
the accused with the desire to ascertain the truth and protect
victims. Over the past three decades, there has been a substantial
increase in understanding the capacities and needs of child
witnesses and victims of child abuse, which have led to dramatic
improvements in the treatment of child victims in the criminal
justice systems of both Canada and the United States. Legal
changes have both reflected and contributed to a better
understanding of the nature and effects of child abuse. Both
countries now deal more effectively with child abuse, and report a
decline in levels of abuse, especially child sexual abuse. 153
There is, however, a continuing need to further reform the
justice system to find a better balance between the rights of the
accused and the interests of children and society. Further
improvements will require consideration of experiences in other
countries, 154 as well as more empirical research about the
experiences of children in court and the long-term effects of the
involvement of the justice system.
152. Nicholas M.C. Bala et al., Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental
Separation: Smokescreen or Fire? 13 J. FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2007).
153. See, e.g., Child Abuse Is on the Decline – Now What?, NATIONAL
CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CENTRE, http://www.nationalcac.org/ncac-blog/childabuse-is-on-the-decline-now-what.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014); but see
Delphine Collin-Vézina et al., Is Child Abuse Declining in Canada? An
Analysis of Child Welfare Data, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 807 (2010).
154. England has undertaken a number of reforms, and proposed others,
that are worthy of careful study in Canada and the USA. See, e.g., Matthew
Hall, Giving Evidence at Age 4: Just Means to Just Ends?, 39 FAM. L. 608,
608–11 (2009).

